Once a new gene has been sequenced, it must be verified whether or not it is similar to previously sequenced genes. In many cases, the organization that sequenced a potentially novel gene needs to keep the sequence itself in confidence. However, to compare the potentially novel sequence with known sequences, it must either be sent as a query to public databases, or these databases must be downloaded onto a local computer: In both cases, the potentially new sequence is exposed to the public. In this work, we propose a novel method to compare sequences without any exact sequence information leaks to the public. This method is based on our previous proposed method [11] to find unique sequences on grid computing environments, which is well-parallelized in reasonable performance. In order to keep the exact sequence infonnation in confidence, this method samples intervals (subsequences) from a sequence, and these intervals are hashed. Any key cryptosystem is not used. The hashed data are open to the public to verify the novelty of the sequence. The experimental results for 19797 h.sapiens genes show that the parallel implementation of this method performs reasonably well in terms of speed and memory usage. In this paper, the implementation on the world-wide testbeds ofEuropean Data Grid (EDG) and its results are described.
Introduction
In the field of molecular biology, it is indispensable to discover new genes related to biologically important reactions. Once such genes have been sequenced, it is necessary to be verified whether the sequences are already reported or not. In order to verify the novelty of the sequences, in general, this verification process involves searching for matches in databases by means of a homology search program.
The comparison process using such a homology search program requires the exact sequences be exposed to public scrutiny. Thus, if it is desired to keep the putative novel sequence confidential, then an alternative approach is conceived to verify its novelty. The simple alternative approach is to gather all databases from all around the world into a local computer. Next, the verification process is executed in-house. However, some of these databases include confidential infonnation, such as private medical information and/or precious experimental information. If you would like to touch such information, you have to establish a contract to keep the information in secret. Furthermore, some of the databases related to business are not freely available to anonymous researchers. Accessing to these databases re- quires quite a few costs. However, in general, all the thing we would like to do after having discovered a new sequence is to verify whether the sequence is already reported or not, and to estimate the similarity to known gene sequences.
On the other hand, the size of the genomic databases around the world is growing at an exponential pace. It is becoming intractable to gather all the databases in local. Therefore, it is unavoidable to propose a parallel calculation method implemented in a distributed computing environment. Due to the development of the infrastructure of world-wide high-speed networks, it is becoming feasible to deploy a distributed computing environment on the Internet. One of the projects that realize this type of computing environment is called the European Data Grid (EDG) 0-7803-9074-1/05/$20.00 ©2005 IEEE project [2] . Providing the infrastructure and tools that make large-scale, secure resource sharing possible and straightforward is the Grid's raison d'etre [3] .
In this work, we implement a novel method to secretly compare sequences without any key cryptosystem on a public grid computing environment. First of all, our proposed sampling method called Interval Sampling, [41 which inhibits the reconstruction of exact sequences, is explained. Next, this method is gridified through our proposed technique [1] and sequences are compared in parallel without any exact information on the international EDG testbeds.
Background
In order to verify whether a sequence is already registered or not, we would like to propose a sequence comparison method which works without exposing the exact sequence of the target genes. Moreover, this method must work in parallel in a distributed computing environment.
In this section, at first, two traditional sequence comparison models are shown. The weak points of these models are discussed. Next, we propose a computation model to resolve such weak points. In this model, sequences are secretly compared in parallel. We present our previous effort to tackle to In this method, regrettably, the new sequence must be exposed through public networks. It is possible to send Figure 2 . When all gene sequences on the tar get databases are gathered into a local com puter, great amounts of network loads and lo cal computing resources are required. More over, all the target databases must be opened.
Secret sequence comparison model
In order to settle the weak points of the traditional sequence comparison models, the following model in Figure  3 is proposed.
Suppose that there exists a one-way process by means of which a sequence is easy to transform but hard to reconstruct, and the processed data have information enough to verify the uniqueness. In other words, a sequence is encoded into a different form, by a straightforward process. On the other hand, the reconstruction of the sequence from these processed data is very difficult. In order to In our proposed method, it becomes unnecessary to expose the exact sequence to the public; we only need to expose its processed data, from which it is very hard to reconstruct the exact sequence. The comparison can therefore be executed on public computer resources by using the processed data. Since each part of the processed data can be calculated individually, the comparison processes can be launched in parallel in distributed computing environments.
We proposed an algorithm to find unique sequences on target genome in reasonable memory size and computing performance [5] . Unique sequences are short sequences which exist only once on the target genes. We also described how to parallelize this algorithm and implement it onto a distributed computing environment. The experimental result on a world-wide grid environment was reported in our previous work [I] . Furthermore, we have proposed a method called Artificial Mutation and Splicing (AMS) site insertion to prevent the reconstruction of the exact sequences [6] . In this method, by means of inserting n sites of artificial mutation and splicing (AMS) into the exact sequences, the number of combinations of the reconstruction is multiplied by 2'. But this method has mainly two weak points. The first is that the total file size grows in proportion to the number of AMS sites, n. The second is that the reconstructed sequences have high similarity to the exact sequence. Taking into consideration these weak points, Interval Sampling (IS) method has been proposed [4] . After IS is applied, the size of the sequence does not increase. Moreover, the similarity between the reconstructed sequences and the exact sequence is very low.
In this work, the implementation of this IS method on a grid computing environment and the experimental results are presented. 
Hash & Divide
The Hash & Divide function is detailed in our previous work [1] . Using the sequence from the left end of the partial sequences on target sequences as their hash-key, all the partial sequences are hashed. And then, the total file can be divided up to the number of the hash-key. This process is of 0(n) when n is the target gene file size. After a sequence is hashed, the length of partial sequences is limited by threshold 0. In other words, the length is equal to or less than 0.
The size of hashed sequences is proportional to 0. Thus, the file size becomes approximately On. Namely, the file size becomes 0 times larger than that of the input sequence.
Here, this function is explained through Figure 4 . Let us note the sequences AGA, TAA and TTG, which are produced by IS from sequence ATTGATAAG. There exist AGA, GA and A as the partial sequences on AGA. On condition that the hash-key length is 1, there exist AGA and A, which have hash-key A at the left end, and GA, which has hash-key G at the left end, as the partial sequences on AGA. In the same manner, by applying the hash function to TAA and TTG, it is confirmed that there are the partial sequences, AGA, A, AA, A having hash-key A, the sequences GA, G having hash-key G, and the sequences TAA, TTG, TG having hash-key T. 
The Link & Sort function is detailed in our previous work [1] . The link function gathers all the subsequences having the same hash-key. The sort function launches the radix-sort-like algorithm we have proposed. This process is of O(n log n) when the total file size is n.
Let us consider the example in Figure 4 . There are the subsequences AGA, A, AA and A, which have hash-key A at the left end, on the left hand of the figure. These subsequences come from ATTGATAAG. On the right-hand, there are the subsequences AGGC and A, which have hashkey A at the left end. These subsequences come from ATCGCGGACC. Now, the link function gathers these subsequences into the leftmost box. In this box, there are AGA, AGGC, AA, A, A and A. These subsequences are sorted. At first, the character, which is on the right hand of the hash-key A, of the subsequences is compared. The character next to the hash-key on AGA, AGGC is G. Hence, these subsequences are grouped together. Next, the second character from the hash-key is compared in this group. The second character on AGA is A. The second character on AGGC is G. Now, these subsequences are separated on the basis of their second character. In each group, there exists one subsequence. Therefore, the unique subsequences AGA, AGG are output. In the same way, the link and sort function is executed for the hash-key sequences, C, G and T. 
Experiments
In this section, an experimental result on the EDG testbeds is shown. The environment of this experiment is as follows. The data sets for the experiments were gathered from the KEGG database [7] . The experiments were done on condition of Interval I -15, hash-key length = 7 and threshold 0 = 30. Thus, the length of the hashed sequences was limited by 30. In other words, unique sequences whose length is more than 30 can not be found.
Target genes were stored on a node of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) ( 1) The h.sapiens gene set did not include TERT. As a result, unique sequences were successfully found. The average length of unique sequence was less than 14. Therefore, it was verified that some partial sequences produced from the TERT gene never appeared on the h.sapiens gene set.
In other words, the TERT gene was unique on the h.sapiens gene set. In addition, the average length said that the similarity between the TERT gene and the other h.sapiens genes was very low. The uniqueness of 99 % of the h. sapiens gene set was verified on this condition. Table 5 shows the annotation of the h.sapiens genes having some unique sequences on condition of Interval value of 15, but no unique sequence on condition of Interval value of 1. When Interval value is 1, the sampled sequences are consecutive on the target genes. Therefore, any short unique sequence as a primer and/or probe can not be designed for these genes.
In this experiment, the length of 30 was assigned as the threshold of after-hashed sequences. When the value of Interval was 15, 30 characters were sampled every 15 bases from the partial sequences whose length was 450. Besides that, let us consider the reconstruction of sequences on a database. Now, suppose that all the gene sequences on the database have the same length, by attaching random sequences at their tail of the sequences. When there are C genes on the database, the possibility of CIPCI is realized by means of IS. Because the origin of sampled sequences can not be distinguished from the anonymous. This value becomes an astronomical figure. Namely, the reconstruction of databases processed by IS is realistically impossible.
In order to improve the sensitivity of the verification, it might be valid to make the value of Interval I small, and to increase threshold 9. That is to say, our method becomes sensitive by making value I small and threshold 0 large. However, the reconstruction from the data processed by IS becomes easier under the influence of the former.
The reconstruction of the before-hashed data from the afterhashed ones becomes easier on account of the latter. There is a trade-off between security and sensitivity.
Application of unique sequences Owing to the Interval Sampling method, it becomes impossible to elaborate target specific primers for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) [8] . However, using the results of this proposed method, it is possible to design probes for Ligase Chain Reaction (LCR) [9] . For example, the average number of unique sequences was about 13 and the value of Interval was 15, in this experiment. Therefore, it is possible to make a set of probes for LCR, whose product length becomes about 200-mer. and VN > 2MB/s, then the computation works well without any stall due to network delay.
An objective of the Data Grid project is to distribute an enormous amount of data into a great deal of databases in the world. In the near future, when it is realized to transfer the data of G-byte order without any difficulties, our proposed method works well on world-wide grid computing environments.
Conclusion
In this research, we proposed a novel sequence comparison method on grid computing environments. Without any key cryptosystem, this method avoids the reconstruction of the exact sequences by means of the Interval Sampling method and the hash function. Only the processed data are opened to the public for security reason. These opened data have information enough to calculate similarity of sequences to verify the novelty of them. As a by-product of the Interval Sampling method, some h.sapiens genes were discovered, which could not be specifically detected by hybridization but by LCR. The sequence comparison has been successfully executed in parallel by means of public grid computing resources.
